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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                        
_____________ 
 
No. 17-1288 
_____________ 
 
PAUL F. SIKORA, 
           Appellant  
 
v. 
 
UPMC, a Pennsylvania non-stock non-profit corporation  
a/k/a UPMC Health System;  
UPMC HEALTH SYSTEM AND AFFILIATES NON 
QUALIFIED SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFIT PLAN  
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
W.D. Pa. No. 2-12-cv-01860 
District Judge: Honorable Mark R. Hornak 
_____________ 
                               
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 25, 2017 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE, and RESTREPO, 
Circuit Judges 
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(Filed: November 24, 2017)       
  
Michael E. Hoover 
Diefenderfer Hoover McKenna & Wood 
310 Grant Street 
Suite 1420 
Pittsburgh, PA  15219 
 Counsel for Appellant 
 
John J. Myers 
Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott 
600 Grant Street 
44th Floor, US Steel Tower 
Pittsburgh, PA  15219 
 Counsel for Appellees 
_____________________ 
 
OPINION of the COURT 
_____________________        
   
SMITH, Chief Judge. 
 
A so-called “top-hat” plan is “a plan which is 
unfunded and is maintained by an employer primarily for 
the purpose of providing deferred compensation for a 
select group of management or highly compensated 
employees.”  29 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(1), 1051(2), 
1081(a)(3).  These plans need not comply with many of 
the substantive provisions of the Employee Retirement 
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Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”).  When Paul F. 
Sikora sought to recover pension benefits under ERISA, 
the District Court held that he was not entitled to obtain 
such relief because he sought benefits under a top-hat 
plan.  Sikora appeals, arguing that the District Court 
should have required Defendants, the University of 
Pittsburgh Medical Center and its Health System and 
Affiliates Non-Qualified Supplemental Benefit Plan 
(collectively, “UMPC”), to prove that plan participants 
had bargaining power before concluding that he 
participated in a top-hat plan.1  Plan participant 
bargaining power, though, is not a substantive element of 
a top-hat plan.  We will therefore affirm the District 
Court’s judgment. 
I 
                                                 
1 While Sikora’s notice of appeal also references the 
District Court’s entry of summary judgment on his 
contract claim, he makes no argument in support of that 
claim in his briefing.  We therefore deem it abandoned.  
See New Jersey v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 640 F.3d 545, 
547 n.3 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 
F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Failure to set forth an 
issue on appeal and present arguments in support of that 
issue in one’s opening brief generally amounts to 
‘abandon[ment] and waive[r of] that issue . . . and it need 
not be addressed by the court of appeals.’”) (alterations 
in original). 
4 
 
Sikora is a former employee of UPMC.  He 
became the Vice President of IT Transformation & IT 
Infrastructure Services in 2005.  Following that position 
change, Sikora became a participant in UPMC’s Non-
Qualified Supplemental Benefit Plan (“the Plan”) in 
2008.  Sikora’s participation in the Plan ended upon his 
voluntary termination from UPMC in 2011.  Sikora 
applied for benefits under the Plan following his 
voluntary termination but was denied benefits for reasons 
unrelated to the current appeal.   
Sikora filed suit against UPMC in the United 
States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania in December 2012.  During discovery, 
UPMC and Sikora each filed motions for partial 
summary judgment.  UPMC argued that the Plan was a 
top-hat plan, and, because three of Sikora’s claims relied 
on ERISA provisions inapplicable to top-hat plans, those 
claims should be dismissed.  Concluding that the Plan 
was a top-hat plan, the District Court granted UPMC’s 
partial summary judgment motion and denied Sikora’s 
motion.  Following completion of discovery, UPMC filed 
a motion for summary judgment as to Sikora’s remaining 
non-ERISA claim, which the District Court granted.  
Sikora timely appealed. 
 
II 
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The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
We exercise plenary review over the District 
Court’s decision to grant summary judgment, and so we 
apply the same standard of review the District Court 
should apply.  See Willis v. UPMC Children’s Hosp. of 
Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 638, 643 (3d Cir. 2015).  We review 
questions of law de novo.  See Samaroo v. Samaroo, 193 
F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 1999) (“We must review legal 
conclusions and questions of statutory construction de 
novo.”). 
III 
ERISA defines top-hat plans as those that are 
“unfunded and . . . maintained by an employer primarily 
for the purpose of providing deferred compensation for a 
select group of management or highly compensated 
employees.”  29 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(1), 1051(2), 
1081(a)(3).  This Court previously described the top-hat 
plan derived from this statutory definition as having three 
elements: (1) “the plan [must] be unfunded”; (2) it must 
“exhibit the required purpose”; and (3) “it must also 
cover a ‘select group’ of employees.”  In re New Valley 
Corp., 89 F.3d 143, 148 (3d Cir. 1996).  Sikora has the 
burden of showing that the Plan is not a top-hat plan to 
obtain relief under ERISA.  See Pane v. RCA Corp., 868 
F.2d 631, 637 (3d Cir. 1989) (rejecting contention that a 
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plan’s status as a top-hat plan is an affirmative defense 
and concluding that § 1101(a)(1) “does not provide for an 
exemption from liability under section 502(a)” but 
instead “merely provides the legal standard by which [a 
defendant’s] section 502(a) liability is to be 
determined”).2   
Sikora does not dispute that the Plan is both 
unfunded and maintained by UPMC for the statutorily 
prescribed purpose.  Sikora takes issue only with the 
third element of the test laid out in In re New Valley 
Corp., which requires that the Plan “cover a ‘select 
group’ of employees.”  In re New Valley Corp., 89 F.3d 
at 148.  This Court has previously described this “select 
group” element as having “both quantitative and 
qualitative restrictions.  In number, the plan must cover 
relatively few employees.  In character, the plan must 
                                                 
2 Sikora contends that UPMC waived reliance on Pane 
by assuming the burden of proving the Plan’s top-hat 
status in its opening summary judgment brief.  Because 
UPMC did (albeit belatedly) raise the issue before the 
District Court, and the District Court did not conclude the 
issue of burden was waived (instead providing Sikora 
with the opportunity to respond to UPMC’s reliance on 
Pane), we too will not deem the issue waived.  Even if 
UPMC had the burden of proving the Plan’s top-hat 
status, it has done so for the reasons explained infra. 
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cover only high level employees.”  Id.  Applying both the 
quantitative and qualitative restrictions of the “select 
group” element reveals that the Plan qualifies as a top-hat 
plan. 
Turning first to the quantitative restriction, the 
Plan covers relatively few employees.  During Sikora’s 
participation in the Plan, approximately 0.1% of the 
entire UPMC workforce was a participant in the Plan.  
See Pane, 868 F.2d at 637 (holding that a plan-participant 
group comprising less than one-tenth of one percent of 
the workforce was numerically select); see also 
Alexander v. Brigham & Women’s Physicians Org., Inc., 
513 F.3d 37, 46 (1st Cir. 2008) (concluding that a plan’s 
participants comprising only 8.7% of entire workforce 
was select); Demery v. Extebank Deferred Comp. Plan 
(B), 216 F.3d 283, 289 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that a 
plan’s participants comprising 15.34% of the relevant 
workforce was sufficiently select).  The quantitative 
restriction of the “select group” element is met.  
As to the qualitative restriction, although the 
relevant statutory language only requires participants to 
be members of a select group of management or highly 
compensated employees, here the Plan covers high-level 
employees who are both a select group of management 
and highly compensated employees.  29 U.S.C. 
§§ 1101(a)(1), 1051(2), 1081(a)(3) (requiring “a select 
group of management or highly compensated 
employees” (emphasis added)).  UPMC allowed only 
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members of management to participate in the Plan.  
Sikora speculates that some Plan participants may have 
had duties rendering them “non-management,” but that 
assertion is without record support.  Even if Sikora’s 
assertion is true, the Plan participants were also highly 
compensated.  During Sikora’s participation in the Plan, 
the lowest paid Plan participant earned an annual salary 
of over $200,000.3  Between 2007 and 2011, the average 
annual salary of Plan participants hovered around 
$500,000, as compared to the average annual salary of all 
UPMC employees, which was around $55,000.  See 
Alexander, 513 F.3d at 46 (observing that plan 
participants earned an average income of $440,000, 
“more than five times the average income” of the 
employer’s workforce and concluding that the question 
of whether plan participants were highly compensated 
was “open-and-shut” in “relative and absolute terms” and 
“nowhere near the gray area”); Demery, 216 F.3d at 289 
(citing evidence that “the average salary of plan 
participants was more than double that of the average 
salary of all . . . employees” to conclude that plan 
participants were highly compensated).  The Plan 
participants were indisputably select members of 
management, and were highly compensated employees.  
The qualitative restriction of the “select group” element 
                                                 
3 In 2008, the lowest paid participant earned only 
$80,000, but that employee was UPMC’s new CEO, who 
earned that amount in only one month of work.   
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is therefore satisfied. Given that both the quantitative and 
qualitative restrictions of the “select group” element have 
been satisfied, we hold that the Plan in question qualifies 
as a top-hat plan. 
IV 
Although both the quantitative and qualitative 
restrictions of the “select group” element have been 
satisfied, Sikora nonetheless argues that the Plan does not 
cover a “select group” because there is no evidence 
regarding the “bargaining power” of the Plan 
participants.  Sikora’s argument would require a district 
court to inquire not only into the qualitative and 
quantitative restrictions discussed above, but also into the 
presence of “bargaining power” before concluding that a 
particular plan is a top-hat plan.  The argument is 
unpersuasive. 
Sikora cites to no text in ERISA nor to any 
legislative history to support his argument.  Instead, he 
relies on a paragraph from a 1990 Department of Labor 
(“DOL”) opinion letter.  The DOL opinion letter states in 
relevant part: 
It is the view of the Department that in 
providing relief for “top hat” plans from the 
broad remedial provisions of ERISA, 
Congress recognized that certain 
individuals, by virtue of their position or 
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compensation level, have the ability to affect 
or substantially influence, through 
negotiation or otherwise, the design and 
operation of their deferred compensation 
plan, taking into consideration any risks 
attendant thereto, and, therefore, would not 
need the substantive rights and protections 
of Title I. 
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Pension & Welfare Benefit 
Programs, Opinion Letter 90-14A at 2 (May 8, 1990).   
 In interpreting this opinion letter, three of our 
sister circuits have inquired into participants’ bargaining 
power before determining whether a particular plan 
qualifies as a top-hat plan.  In Bakri v. Venture Mfg. Co., 
the Sixth Circuit favorably quoted a district court opinion 
highlighting the importance of participants engaging in 
“direct negotiations with the employer.”  Bakri v. 
Venture Mfg. Co., 473 F.3d 677, 678-79 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(quoting Carrabba v. Randalls Food Markets, Inc., 38 F. 
Supp. 2d 468, 478 (N.D. Tex. 1999)).  Quoting the 
district court’s opinion, the Bakri court noted that “the 
‘select group’ test is whether the members of the group 
have positions with the employer of such influence that 
they can protect their retirement and deferred 
compensation expectations by direct negotiations with 
the employer.”  Id.  Writing that the plan in question 
“consisted of employees . . . who had no supervisory, 
policy making, or executive responsibility, and had little 
11 
 
ability to negotiate pension, pay or bonus compensation” 
the Sixth Circuit concluded that the “select group” 
element had not been satisfied.  Id. at 680. 
 In Demery v. Extebank Deferred Comp. Plan (B), 
the Second Circuit similarly inquired into participants’ 
ability to negotiate.  As the Second Circuit wrote in that 
case: 
Plaintiffs also claim that the participants in 
Plan B did not have the ability to negotiate 
the terms of the Plan. Ability to negotiate is 
an important component of top hat plans . . . 
. We do not think plaintiffs have proffered 
either direct or circumstantial evidence 
suggesting an absence of bargaining power 
sufficient to raise a question of fact on this 
issue. 
Demery, 216 F.3d at 289.   
Finally, in Duggan v. Hobbs, the Ninth Circuit 
wrote that “the ‘select group’ requirement includes more 
than a mere statistical analysis.”  Duggan v. Hobbs, 99 
F.3d 307, 312 (9th Cir. 1996).  Citing to the DOL opinion 
letter, the Duggan court noted that the “Department of 
Labor has explained that the top-hat exception was 
intended to apply to employees who ‘by virtue of their 
position or compensation level, have the ability to affect 
or substantially influence, through negotiation or 
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otherwise, the design and operation of their deferred 
compensation plan.’”  Id. at 312-13 (quoting U.S. Dep’t 
of Labor, Pension & Welfare Benefit Programs, Opinion 
Letter 90-14A at 2 (May 8, 1990)).  After noting that the 
participant in the plan in question “exerted sufficient 
influence,” the Ninth Circuit concluded that the plan 
“was maintained for a ‘select group’” within the relevant 
statutory language.  Id. at 313. 
 The First Circuit has expressed a different view, 
one which is in tension with the positions taken by the 
Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits.  In Alexander v. 
Brigham & Women's Physicians Org., Inc., that court 
declined “the appellant’s invitation to depart from the 
plain language of the statute and jerry-build onto it a 
requirement of individual bargaining power.”  Alexander 
v. Brigham & Women’s Physicians Org., Inc., 513 F.3d 
37, 47 (1st Cir. 2008).  The First Circuit explained: 
The DOL opinion letter speaks only to 
Congress’s rationale for enacting the top-hat 
provision. It does not present itself as an 
interpretation of the provision’s 
requirements, nor does it make any mention 
of the need for or propriety of demanding 
that employers demonstrate their employees’ 
ability to negotiate the terms of deferred 
compensation plans. 
Id. We agree with the First Circuit’s approach. On its 
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face, the opinion letter does not require that participants 
in a top-hat plan possess bargaining power.  The opinion 
letter does, however, explain Congress’s intent for 
creating top-hat plans.  On that point, the opinion letter is 
therefore entitled to persuasive deference under Skidmore 
v. Swift & Co, 323 U.S. 134 (1944).  See Alexander, 513 
F.3d at 47 (“We have no quarrel with the letter’s 
persuasiveness as a gloss on Congress’s intentions in 
enacting the top-hat provision.”); see also Parker v. 
NutriSystem, Inc., 620 F.3d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(stating that, under Skidmore, statutory interpretations in 
opinion letters are given deference to the extent they 
persuade).  
The opinion letter’s explanation undermines 
Sikora’s position.  Rather than suggest that courts inquire 
into whether a particular participant wielded the requisite 
level of “bargaining power,” the opinion letter observes 
that participants in top-hat plans were deemed by 
Congress to possess bargaining power “by virtue of their 
position or compensation level.”  In other words, 
Congress felt justified in including the top-hat plan 
provisions in ERISA, at least in part because individuals 
in positions such as Sikora’s “have the ability to affect or 
substantially influence, through negotiation or otherwise, 
the design and operation of their deferred compensation 
plan.”  In short, reading the DOL opinion letter in light of 
Skidmore does not support Sikora’s position.   
Although the Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits 
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have inquired into plan participants’ bargaining power, 
those decisions do not clearly adopt bargaining power as 
an additional requirement.4  Even assuming that those 
opinions did adopt bargaining power as an additional 
requirement, they offer no reason for doing so.  Given 
that lack of reasoning, the plain text of ERISA’s top-hat 
provisions, and our reading of the DOL’s opinion letter, 
we decline to engraft a bargaining power requirement 
onto the elements of a top-hat plan.  We conclude that 
plan participants’ bargaining power is not a substantive 
element of a top-hat plan.   
V 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
                                                 
4 The Sixth Circuit in Bakri, for example, did not 
explicitly mention bargaining power when it laid out the 
factors it uses to determine whether a plan qualifies as a 
top-hat plan.  Bakri 473 F.3d at 678 (6th Cir. 2007) (“In 
determining whether a plan qualifies as a top hat plan, we 
consider both qualitative and quantitative factors, 
including (1) the percentage of the total workforce 
invited to join the plan (quantitative), (2) the nature of 
their employment duties (qualitative), (3) the 
compensation disparity between top hat plan members 
and non-members (qualitative), and (4) the actual 
language of the plan agreement (qualitative).”). 
 
